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ABSTRACT:    
 
Information technology is redefining national security and the use of force by state and 
nonstate actors. The use of force over the Internet warrants analysis given recent terrorist 
attacks.  At the same time that information technology empowers states and their 
commercial enterprises, information technology makes infrastructures supported by 
computer systems increasingly accessible, interdependent, and more vulnerable to 
malicious attack. The Computer Security Institute and the FBI jointly estimate that 
financial losses attributed to malicious attack amounted to $378 million in 2000.   
International Law clearly permits a state to respond in self-defense when attacked by 
another state through the Internet, however, such attacks may not always rise to the 
scope, duration, and intensity threshold of an armed attack that may justify a use of force  
in self-defense. 
 
This paper presents a policy framework to analyze the rules of engagement for Internet 
attacks.  We describe the state of Internet security, incentives for asymmetric warfare, 
and the development of international law for conflict management and armed conflict.  
We focus on options for future rules of engagement specific to Information Warfare. 
 
We conclude with four policy recommendations for Internet attack rules of engagement: 
(1) the U.S. should pursue international definitions of “force” and “armed attack” in the 
Information Warfare context; (2) the U.S. should pursue international cooperation for the 
joint investigation and prosecution of Internet attacks; (3) the U.S. must balance offensive 
opportunities against defensive vulnerabilities; and (4) the U.S. should prepare strategic 
plans now rather than making policy decisions in real-time during an Internet attack.  
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1.0   Introduction 
 
The development of “information warfare” (IW) presents policy issues related to a 
nation’s efforts to both execute and respond to certain IW attacks, specifically those 
attacks using computers, telecommunications, or networks to attack adversary 
information systems.  The development of information technology makes it possible for 
adversaries to attack each other in new ways and with new forms of damage and may 
create new targets for attack.  Furthermore, the ability of signals to travel across 
international boundaries and affect systems remotely makes the application of 
international law problematic since the longstanding principle of national territorial 
sovereignty is difficult to apply to the Internet. 
 
We define IW as an attack on information systems for military advantage using tactics of 
destruction, denial, exploitation, and/or deception.[YURCIK97]  An information system 
is defined as the life cycle of information generation/utilization based on a goal-directed 
activity.  Fischer (1984) defines the life cycle of information in eleven distinct stages: 
 
     1   data collection 
     2   data movement 
     3   data entry 
     4   data transmission 
     5   data reception 
     6   data processing 
     7   output preparation 
     8   output movement 
     9   data retrieval 
     10  data dissemination 
     11  data usage 
 
The information cycle is vulnerable to an IW attack at each and every stage.  While 
current research is searching for robust protection solutions for each stage in the 
information cycle, there is a systemic problem in that for every new protection a new 
threat can be developed in response. 
 
The US is potentially vulnerable to IW attack because it is more dependent on 
information systems than any other country in the world.   Industrial society is 
increasingly dependent upon open large-scale infrastructure systems that operate 
interdependently such that a failure in one infrastructure can crossover into another 
infrastructure (i.e., a power grid failure affecting transportation systems).  Although the 
efficiency and quality of services these infrastructures provide is increasing, the 
interconnectivity of computer systems also increases accessibility to IW attack. 
 
A Presidential Commission was formed on July 15, 1996 by Executive Order 13010 to 
issue recommendations on how to best protect from IW attack critical national 
infrastructures considered so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on the defense and economic security of the U.S.  In response to this 
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commission’s report, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD63) establishes new 
governmental structures including: 
 
NIPC – National Infrastructure Protection Center 
Focal point for threat assessment, warning, investigation,  and 
response to threats or attacks against critical infrastructures 
 
 
CIAO – Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
Responsible for integrating the various infrastructure sector plans into 
a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan and coordinating analyses of 
the U.S. government’s dependencies on critical infrastructure 
 
In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has budgeted billions of dollars to IW 
and all the military services have formed distinct IW organizations which are drafting IW 
military strategies.[YURCIK97] Specifically, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) funds on-going national research in defensive information 
survivability where survivability is defined as the ability of a system to continue 
functioning when part of system is unavailable due to failure, accident, or malicious 
attack.  
 
International concern has also been raised over the potential for damage and disruption 
caused by military operations against and through information systems linked by the 
Internet. The following is excerpted from a United Nations General Assembly resolution 
that resulted from an initiative by the Russian Federation.  This resolution calls upon 
Member States to promote multilateral “consideration of existing and potential threats in 
the field of information security”. Although couched in the terms of the use of force by 
non-state actors, it was initiated in the First Committee, which concerns itself with 
disarmament between Member States. The momentum of the international community 
will likely yield an attempt to prohibit certain military applications of the Internet but will 
more likely result in an informal yet better understanding of the application of 
international law to the use of force via the Internet by Member States.   
 
 
Developments in Telecommunication and Information in 
the Context of International Security3 
 
Noting that considerable progress has been achieved in developing and 
applying the latest information technologies and means of 
telecommunication… 
 
Expressing concern that these technologies and means can potentially 
be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of 
maintaining international stability and security, and may adversely 
affect the security of States… 
 
                                                          
3 General Assembly Resolution 5/70, United Nations 53rd Session, UN document A/RES/53/70 (1998).  
This resolution was an initiative of the Russian Federation that originated in the First Committee 
(Disarmament and International Security) of the UN General Assembly. 
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Considering that it is necessary to prevent the misuse or exploitation of 
information resources or technologies for criminal or terrorist 
purposes…  
 
1. Calls upon Member States to promote at multilateral levels the 
consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of 
information security; 
 
2. Invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their 
views and assessments of the following questions: 
 
(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security; 
 
(b) Definition of basic notions related to information security, including 
unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and 
telecommunications systems and information resources;  
 
(c) Advisability of developing international principles that would enhance 
       the security of global information and telecommunications systems and 
help combat information terrorism and criminality. 
 
While the number of Internet attacks being investigated by the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) doubled from 1998 to 1999 (from 547 to 1,154), there has not been a 
consensus that this increase represents a aggregate threat to critical infrastructures.[FBI]   
Based on a March 2001 survey of 538 major organizations, the Computer Security 
Institute (CSI) with the assistance of the FBI estimated that the total losses attributable to 
computer crime was $378 million for calendar year 2000.[CSI01] Public awareness was 
achieved in February 2000, when a series of coordinated denial-of-service IW attacks 
were launched against major US corporations.4   Not only did the attacks prevent 5 of the 
10 most popular Internet websites from serving its customers but the attacks also slowed 
down the entire Internet - Keynote Systems measured a 60% degradation in the 
performance of the 40 other websites that had not been attacked.[NELSON00]  While the 
consensus analysis of these IW attacks is that they were technologically unsophisticated 
(executing a downloadable program), it is particularly disturbing the ease at which major 
corporate operations can be disrupted and the lack of defenses to prevent such attacks 
from re-occurring in the future.  These attacks made newspaper headlines and lead to a 
White House meeting with leading E-Commerce parties. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes reasons for the 
poor state of security on the Internet, an environment ripe for IW.  Section 3 introduces 
“asymmetric warfare” as motivation and gives examples of significant events that have 
already occurred. Section 4 cites international law relevant to the “use of force” and its 
application to IW. Section 5 discusses counter-offensive IW strategic options with their 
relevant ramifications. We close with a summary of conclusions and recommendations in 
Section 6.    
 
                                                          
4 The companies in the order they were attacked are: Yahoo! (2/7/00), eBay (2/8/00), Buy.com (2/8/00), 
Amazon.com (2/8/00), CNN (2/8/00), ZDNet.com (2/9/00), E*Trade (2/9/00), Excite At Home (2/9/00), 
and Datek (2/9/00).  
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2.0 What Is Going Wrong With Security on the Internet? 
 
If history is any indication, the information technology community is incapable of 
constructing networked information systems that can consistently prevent successful 
attacks.  Even an organization where network and computer security is paramount such as 
the US DoD has continuously demonstrated how susceptible it is to attack.5   There are 
many factors which contribute to the poor state of security on the Internet, but here we 
focus on only the top four factors. 
 
First, most software today is tested for security (assurance testing) by the penetrate-and-
patch approach – when someone finds an exploitable security “hole” the software 
manufacturer issues a patch.[REITER99] The intellectual complexity associated with 
software design, coding, and testing virtually ensures the presence of “bugs” in software 
that can be exploited by attackers. This approach has proved inadequate since after-the-
fact security leaves bug vulnerabilities open until they are exploited.  However, software 
manufacturers find this approach economically attractive – why invest time and money in 
assurance testing if consumers are not willing to pay a premium.     
 
Second, software vulnerabilities will be discovered in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
and public-domain products whose internal structures are widely available and hence can 
be analyzed by attackers.  The ability to discover software vulnerabilities and the 
homogeneity of software from the same manufacturer (i.e., Microsoft, Sun) make it 
possible for a single-attack strategy to have a wide-ranging and devastating impact. 
 
Third, poor system administration practices result in a system remaining susceptible to 
vulnerabilities even after corresponding patches have been issued from software 
manufacturers.  An otherwise secure system that does not fix a previously unknown 
vulnerability after a publicly announced patch has been released from the software 
manufacturer is instantly an open target for exploitation.   Poor maintenance practices can 
neutralize existing security safeguards. 
 
Lastly, even if special software from one manufacturer is “assured”, it is executed on the 
same system with “non-assured” software such that new vulnerabilities are introduced 
into the system as a whole.6[REITER99]  When COTS products are incorporated as 
components of a larger system, the entire system become vulnerable to attacks based on 
the exploitable COTS bugs again making it possible for a single-attack strategy to have a 
wide-ranging and devastating impact.     
                                                          
5 Specifically network security refers to protection of traffic as it traverses a network end-to-end or between 
nodes and computer security refers to operating system authentication of users (identity) and file system 
privileges.  However, since networks consist of special-purpose computers (switches, routers, hubs) and 
computers rely on network/bus connectivity for peripherals and distributed services (Email, www, file 
system) we will not continue to make a distinction between network and computer security for the purposes 
of this paper.  Later in the paper we discuss multiple examples of successful attacks against the US DoD. 
6 Developing systems via software integration and reuse rather than customized design and coding is a 
cornerstone of modern software engineering.(Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon 
University)  
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The natural escalation of offensive threats versus defensive countermeasures has 
demonstrated time and again that no practical systems can be built that are invulnerable 
to attack.  Despite industry’s efforts (or in spite of them), there can be no assurance that 
any system will not be compromised.  Thus, the traditional view of information systems 
security must be expanded to encompass the specification and design of survivable 
systems that can survive attacks that cannot be completely repelled.   The ubiquity of the 
Internet has only acerbated this problem by enabling automated, anonymous, and remote 
attacks by hostile nations who previously did not have a non-conventional military 
option. 
 
 
3.0 Asymmetrical Warfare 
 
In 1974 the DoD’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and a number of 
universities began building the ARPANET, defining and standardizing the TCP/IP 
protocols and writing Requests for Comments (RFC) standards.  By 1985, a fully 
functional Internet existed and was being used by academics and the military.  Between 
1986-1990, the U.S. Army installed TCP/IP on its IBM mainframes at its finance centers, 
logistic supply centers, and central data processing centers which up to this point had 
used only IBM’s proprietary protocols (SNA and Bisync).  Within six weeks of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) 
had designed and made fully operational a TCP/IP network in Saudi Arabia using COTS 
products.  This network was a significant complement to existing Command-and-Control 
systems and satisfied battlefield requirements for unclassified logistics data as well as 
being reconfigurable in “real-time” as the situation changed.  Just as the Patriot missile 
became the hero of the U.S. Army’s Desert Storm Weapons systems, the Internet had 
become the hero of Operation Desert Storm’s information systems. [WEISSERT92] 
Further military development of the Internet beyond Operation Desert Storm is discussed 
throughout this paper. 
 
However, there are significant strategic problems with military dependence upon the 
Internet.  The open architecture of the Internet is ideally suited for “asymmetrical 
warfare”, a military term referring to the indirect use of force on an opponent as opposed 
to a direct force-on-force confrontation.   The conventional military force (Army, Navy, 
Air Force, Marines) of the U.S., as exhibited in recent operations, is unquestionably 
supreme as the world’s remaining superpower.7 However, much of the U.S. military 
capability is supported by underlying information systems with their corresponding 
vulnerability to attack.  Information systems are so critical to military operations that it is 
often more effective to attack an opponent’s information system than to concentrate on 
directly destroying conventional military forces. International law has long recognized 
the control and use of information such as signal intelligence, communications 
intelligence, electronics intelligence, foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, and 
                                                          
7 Even with drastic cuts the U.S. military budget is larger than all other nation’s military budgets combined. 
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imagery intelligence.8  There is a perception within military circles that control and use of 
information may be more important than air superiority in previous wars.[YURCIK97]   
 
The tactical and strategic use of this intelligence gathered via networked information is 
embraced in the operational DoD concept of “information operations”.  Over the Internet, 
attackers can anonymously collect a wide range of intelligence (sensitive/classified 
information), manipulate data to deceive decision-makers, influence public opinion, and 
even cause physical damage.  “Tapping” into an adversary’s command-and-control 
system provides the ultimate information about enemy battle plans and has been the 
motivation behind trillions of dollars of U.S. spy operations during the Cold War.9  The 
longer the “tap” remains undetected the longer the intelligence flows.  Psychological 
operations (PSYOPS) include implanting false information about troop locations and 
battlefield conditions into enemy computers to subvert adversary decision-making. 
 
An attacking state with a capability in information technology does not need conventional 
military force to execute an organized, large-scale attack on U.S. military, commercial, or 
civilian targets from remote locations abroad.    The asymmetry of IW is highlighted in 
that an attacker does not need an underlying information infrastructure that would itself 
be vulnerable to counter-attack.   With an investment of a few thousand dollars in 
consumer personal computers, a dedicated and persistent hostile attacker can gain access 
to almost any Internet-linked information infrastructure of any state in the world and yet 
lack sufficient targets for any IW retaliation.[SHARP99] 
 
The Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet, has 
repeatedly stated in testimony before Congressional hearings that more than a dozen 
countries – among them Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, France, and Israel – are 
developing significant IW capabilities.  A senior CIA official cited a Russian General 
who compared the disruptive effects of IW on transportation and the electric grid as 
comparable to the effects of a nuclear weapon.[STROBEL00]  China is considering the 
creation of a fourth branch of its armed service devoted to IW.[STROBEL00] The 
following is quoted from congressional testimony: 
 
                                                          
8 Signal intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence information comprising either individually or in combination 
all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, 
however transmitted.  Communications intelligence (COMINT) is technical and intelligence information 
derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.    (ELINT) is technical and 
intelligence information derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiation emanating 
from other than nuclear detonation or radioactive sources. Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence 
(FISINT) is technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic 
emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-US aerospace, surface, and 
subsurface systems such as telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data links.  Imagery 
intelligence (IMINT) is intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, 
infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of 
objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. 
Definitions from National Security Law by John Norton Moore et. al., editors 1990. 
9 For one source of information see Blind Man’s Bluff by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew 
(HarperCollins 1998) which documents Cold War operations by US spy submarines including “taps” on 
Russian Command and Control undersea cables. 
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“We are detecting, with increasing frequency, the appearance of 
doctrine and dedicated offensive cyberwarfare programs in other 
countries.  We have identified several (countries), based on all-source 
intelligence information, that are pursuing government-sponsored 
offensive cyberprograms… Information Warfare is becoming a 
strategic alternative for countries that realize that, in conventional 
military confrontation with the United States, they will not prevail.  
These countries perceive that cyberattacks launched within or outside 
of the U.S. represent the kind of asymmetric option they will need to 
level the playing field during an armed crisis against the U.S.. … The 
very same means that the cybervandals used a few weeks ago could 
also be used on a much more massive scale at the nation-state level to 
generate truly damaging interruptions to the national economy and 
infrastructure.”10  
 
Examples of IW involving the U.S. include the following: During Operation Desert 
Storm (between April 1990 and May 1991), hackers from the Netherlands penetrated 34 
U.S. military sites including military supply systems11 and gained such information as the 
exact location of U.S. troops, their weapons, and the movement of U.S. 
warships.[DENNING99]  During the military exercise Eligible Receiver in June 1997, 
the NSA demonstrated that a hostile enemy state could disrupt computer operations at 
major military commands, cause large-scale blackouts, and interrupt emergency service 
in Washington D.C. in several other cities in the U.S.[GRAHAM98,MCCULLOGH00]    
In February 1998 two intruders accessed (but did not compromise) sensitive DoD 
systems during planning for military airstrikes in Iraq. [GRAHAM98]   
 
The first reported organized attack over the Internet by one state against computers in 
another state was a highly organized attack by Indonesia in January 1999 against the 
virtual country domain of East Timor supported by non-government computers in 
Ireland.[SHARP99]  Burma’s military junta is blamed for the “Happy 99” Email virus 
sent to dissidents.[STROBEL00]  In the summer of 1999, after Taiwan’s President Lee 
Teng-Hui voiced support for the islands independence, China began to launch IW attacks 
aimed at altering official Taiwanese government websites which culminated in a national 
blackout and crashing of financial networks.[STANTON00]   In January 2000, 
Azerbaijan hackers tampered with dozens of Armenian-related websites including host 
computers in the U.S.12[STROBEL00]     Internet sites belonging to the Falun Gong 
spiritual movement based in Long Island New York have been attacked by the People’s 
Republic of China’s Secret Police in Beijing.13   
 
                                                          
10 John Serabian, the CIA’s information operations issue manager, in testimony before the Joint Economic 
Committee of Congress 3/4/00. 
11 US military forces are particularly dependent upon non-military systems for deployment and logistics. 
12 Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.  Jonathon Peizer 
of the Open Society Institute whose office was affected by the Azerbaijan IW attack stated, “(It is) the first 
precedent of a physical battle going online.”[STROBEL00]  
13 These attacks were traced back to the XinAn Information Service Center which is part of the Ministry of 
Public Security – China’s Secret Police.[STROBEL00] 
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4.0  What Constitutes the Use of Force on the Internet? 
 
When are states allowed to use force against each other on the Internet?  For example, the 
United States has the right under existing international law to respond with military force 
if a state destroyed or significantly damaged the New York Stock Exchange by the use of 
computer viruses or other network attack.  Although the argument that IW would violate 
neutrality is strong, encroachments beyond a nation’s borders that violate neutrality have, 
in the past, been physical intrusions.   For example, orbital remote sensing, which may 
include the bombardment of a country’s territory with radar or other forms of 
electromagnetic radiation, is permissible during war or peace.  
 
4.1   International Law of Conflict Management 
 
 The law of conflict management, jus ad bellum, is a set of rules that govern the resort to 
armed conflict and determine whether the conflict is lawful or unlawful in its inception. 
[YURCIK97, SHARP99]  Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations 
codifies contemporary jus ad bellum.  If a state activity is a use of force within the 
meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter, it is unlawful unless it is an exercise of that state’s 
right of self-defense or unless specifically authorized by the Security Council under its 
Chapter VII authority. 
 
Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations empowers the UN Security Council to 
authorize the use of force to maintain international peace and security under international 
law at a threshold lower than when states are authorized to use force in self-defense.  A 
blockade, for example, that would be otherwise unlawful under international law if 
committed by a state unilaterally would be lawful if authorized by the UN Security 
Council under its Chapter VII authority.  A “virtual” blockade became an Internet issue 
in 1999 when Loral Space & Communications and UUNET were involved in 
negotiations with the U.S. State and Treasury Departments to disconnect Yugoslavia 
from the Internet.[ZERO99] 
 
Customary international law requires that all uses of force be “necessary” and 
“proportional” and it prohibits the use of force for retaliatory or punitive 
actions.[YURCIK97]   The principle of necessity requires that the use of force for self-
defense is justified by a continuing threat which has not been alleviated with all other 
possible means.  The principle of proportionality requires that the use of force be of the 
same intensity and magnitude necessary to promptly secure the limited military objective 
of self-defense given the possibility of collateral civilian destruction.  It is emphatically 
not a requirement of the principle of proportionality that any “necessary” self-defense 
limit itself to weapon systems employed by the aggressor or matching troop strength 
levels.[SHARP99]  The principle of proportionality balances the need to attack a 
“military objective” with the collateral effects of civilian deaths and property damage.  In 
the absence of civilians, the principle of proportionality imposes no limitations on the use 
of force.    A lawful “military objective” includes combatants and:   
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those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, 
effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining 
capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or 
neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the 
attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack.  [SHARP99] 
 
While the principle of proportionality limits the use of force given civilian collateral 
damage, it does not prohibit any damage to civilians including death, injury, or property.  
While civilians and civilian property may not be the objective of an attack, states may use 
force against civilians, civilian property, and activities that support or maintain an enemy 
state’s warfighting capability.   For example, states may use force during armed conflict 
against economic targets such as telecommunications, rail yards, bridges, ports, industrial 
plants producing warfighting products, and the electric power grid.  It is commonly 
quoted that in the U.S. 95% of all military communications is carried over civilian 
infrastructure thus intermingling military/civilian targets.  In most modern societies, 
much of the civilian infrastructure is used for military purposes and is thus subject to 
lawful attack during armed conflict if there is a military advantage to be gained by such 
an attack. 
 
To the extent private industry and civilians and especially communications have 
supported war efforts, they have always been a lawful target under the law of armed 
conflict.  Undersea cables, including those connecting belligerents with neutrals, have 
been interfered with during all naval wars since the Spanish American 
War.[GREENBERG98]  For example, as World War I began in August 1914, the British 
cableship Telconia cut Germany’s undersea cables and reeled in the loose ends to prevent 
repair. The infamous Zimmerman telegram intercepted from an undersea cable from 
Germany to Mexico was one of the precipitating events to bring the U.S. into World War 
I. However, the current difference is that modern society’s increasing dependence on 
underlying computerized infrastructures makes more civilian infrastructures highly 
vulnerable and subject to justifiable attacks from remote locations via the Internet. 
 
4.2 International Law of Armed Conflict 
 
Any attack involving networks and telecommunications may implicate the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and its underlying charter, the International 
Telecommunication Convention (ITC) which apply to international wire and radio 
frequency communications.  The relevant jurisdiction of the ITU is spectrum interference 
– the ITU allocates frequency spectrum to prevent interference and states may not 
broadcast false or misleading signals.  In practice, governments have conducted radio 
jamming in both peace and war for over 60 years beginning with Austria’s efforts to 
block broadcasts from Nazi Germany in 1934.    
 
The law of war, jus in bello, also commonly referred to as the law of armed conflict, is 
derived in part from Christian “just war” doctrine and governs the actual conduct of 
hostilities and has developed as customary international law over thousands of 
years.[SHARP99,YURCIK97]   The law of armed conflict is codified in two regimes: (1) 
the Hague Regulations that govern the means and methods of warfare, and (2) the 
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Geneva Conventions that govern the protection of victims of war.  The continued 
existence of war atrocities is not a failure of the rule of law but rather a failure of the 
international community to enforce the law.[SHARP99] 
 
According to Common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, an 
international armed conflict exists upon declaration of war, the occurrence of “any other 
armed conflict” between two or more parties (even if the state of war has not been 
declared), and in all cases of partial or total occupation even if met with no armed 
resistance.  Although the terms ‘war’ and ‘armed conflict’ are frequently used 
interchangeably and refer to a state of hostilities that invokes the law of armed conflict, 
war refers to a state of de jure hostilities invoked by formal declaration by one party that 
creates an international armed conflict as a matter of law.  In contrast, ‘any other armed 
conflict’ refers to a state of de facto hostilities invoked by the use of force by one party 
without formal declaration of war.   
 
4.3 Evolution of U.S. Rules of Engagement 
 
The consensus of the international community is that de facto armed conflict exists 
between states when the scope, duration, and intensity of force between them reaches the 
level of armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.   What 
constitutes a use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that constitutes an armed 
attack and triggers the law of armed conflict is a question of fact that must be subjectively 
analyzed in each and every case in the context of all relevant law and circumstances. 
 
In 1983, the U.S. Department of State defined ‘armed conflict’ as “any situation in which 
there is hostile action between the armed forces of two parties, regardless of duration, 
intensity, or scope of the fighting and irrespective of whether a state of war exists 
between the two parties.”14    
 
In 1997, the U.S. was adopted the following position during the ratification process of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention: 
 
“In accordance with Condition (26) on Riot Control Agents, I have 
certified that the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its 
use of riot control agents in various peacetime and peacekeeping 
operations.  These are situations in which the United States is not 
engaged in a use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would 
trigger the laws of war with respect to U.S. forces.”15 
 
This reversal of position from 1983 to 1997 was a result of the increasing use of U.S. 
troops in peace-keeping efforts world-wide.  The intent was to allow U.S. peace-keeping 
                                                          
14 This quote is taken from a press release from the Department of State in the case of U.S. Navy Lieutenant 
Robert O. Goodman Jr. who was shot down and held by Syria.  The issue of Goodman’s status as a 
‘prisoner of war’ were raised under the Geneva Convention. 
15 President’s Certifications and Report to the Congress in Connection with the U.S. Senate Resolution of 
Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, April 25, 1997. 
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personnel to use force in self-defense.  Otherwise, U.S. peacekeeping personnel would 
become lawful targets of a “de facto armed conflict”. 
 
4.4 A Special Case: Perfidy 
 
A special case of manipulating information is perfidy. Although diversionary tactics are 
unquestionably permissible in war, not all acts of deception are. Perfidious acts include 
feigning protected status for purposes of attacking the enemy.[SHARP99]   Certain IW 
attacks may fall under this category.  For example, manipulating enemy information 
systems into identifying U.S. military targets as neutral would be perfidy.[SHARP99] 
 
 
5.0 Current Rules of Engagement 
 
There are no characterized rules of engagement for IW conflicts which can take many 
different forms (isolated operations or undeclared wars between states).  We next 
examine more closely the current general rules of engagement for the U.S. military and 
then examine options for future rules of engagement specific to IW. 
 
“Hostile act” and “hostile intent” are the operational concepts integral to the ROE of a 
state that acts upon its inherent right of self-defense.   The “Standing Rules of 
Engagement for U.S. Forces” (SROE) define hostile act and hostile intent as follows: 
 
Hostile Act: An attack or other use of force against the United States, 
,US forces, and, in certain circumstances, US nationals, their property, 
US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US forces, foreign 
nationals and their property.  It is also force used directly to preclude or 
impede the mission and/or duties of US forces,  including the recovery 
of US personnel and votal US Government property.[SROE00] 
 
Examples of hostile acts include blockades; the destruction of early warning or 
command-and control systems; and any use of military force.  Although all uses of force 
are not of the scope, duration, and intensity to constitute an armed attack, state activities 
that constitute a hostile act are a use of force that constitutes an armed attack and a state 
which is the object of that hostile act has the right to use necessary and proportional force 
to respond in self-defense.[SHARP99] 
 
Hostile Intent:  The threat of imminent use of force against the 
United States, US forces, and in certain circumstances,  US nationals, 
their property, US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US 
forces, foreign nationals, and their property.  Also, the threat of force to 
preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including 
the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.[SROE00] 
 
Declaring Forces Hostile:  Once a force is declared hostile by 
appropriate authority, US units need not observe a hostile act or a 
demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force.  The 
responsibility for exercising the right and obligation of national self-
defense and as necessary declaring a force hostile is a matter of the 
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utmost importance.  All available intelligence, the status of 
international relationships, the requirements of international law, an 
appreciation of the political situation, and the potential consequences 
for the United States must be carefully weighed.  The exercise of the 
right and obligation of national self-defense by competent authority is 
separate from and in no way limits the commander’s right and 
obligation to exercise unit self-defense.[SROE00] 
 
Isolated verbal threats and threats of the use of force that are conveyed by troop/weapon 
movements and alliances do not constitute hostile intent.  Examples of hostile intent 
include the use of force conveyed by massing of troops at a border, weapon 
status/targeting indications, the tactical use of fire control radar, and interference with 
early warning/command-and-control systems.  State activities that convey hostile intent 
constitute a threat to use force and a state, which is the object of that hostile intent, has 
the right to use necessary and proportional force to respond in anticipatory self-defense.  
  
5.1     Future Rules of Engagement: Counter-Offensive IW  
 
Eventually a nation state will determine that the potential gains of an IW attack on the 
U.S. (or those of our allies and/or neighbors) outweigh the potential risks of such actions.  
In a defensive stance, the U.S. can manage these risks – the risks of being identified and 
the risks of punishment.  Identification is largely a technical problem at the current time 
so deterrence is the policy option we will focus upon.   
 
The Pentagon’s current “purely passive” policy of prohibiting the DoD from mounting a 
retaliatory counter IW attack could result in “severe consequences for U.S. military 
capabilities” according to a 1999 report issued by the National Research Council 
(NRC).[NRC99]    Under current policies DoD can only track IW attacks and when the 
attacker can be identified, the DoD must transfer the responsibility of prosecuting non-
state actors to law enforcement officials. 
 
The NRC report, which includes a review of DoD command, control, communications, 
computer, and information systems (C4I) policies and practices added weight to 
statements by top Pentagon officials that attacks against DoD information systems that 
are critical to a new doctrine of information-based warfare continue to escalate while 
passive defensive measures lag.  Simply protecting information systems from attack may 
not work in the future: 
 
“DoD is in an increasingly compromised position.  The rate at which 
information systems are being relied on outstrips the rate at which they 
are being protected…  The time needed to develop and deploy effective 
defenses in cyberspace is much longer than the time required to mount 
an attack” [BREWIN99] 
 
Although the NRC report raises many policy issues, it specifically urges the Pentagon 
leadership to “review the legal limits in its ability to defend itself and its C4I 
infrastructure from attack.  [Then DoD] should take the lead in advocating changes in 
national policy (including legislation if necessary) that amend the rules of engagement 
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specifying the circumstances under which force [would be] an appropriate response to a 
cyber-attack.”16 [BREWIN99] 
 
Maintaining a credible ability to use force on the Internet is lawful and a fundamentally 
important aspect of deterrence and international peace and security.  Even clearly defined 
laws and norms of behavior are not adequate to control aggressive states, terrorists, and 
criminals.  Accordingly, states must maintain a strong and credible ability to use force 
when necessary in self-defense to ensure the rule of international law is enforced.  The 
strategic policy decision to threaten or use forces in not inherently unlawful or evil but 
rather essential to the maintenance of international peace and security.  Indeed, the 
collective use of force by the international community is the core principle upon which 
the Charter of the United Nations is built.  International law outlaws only the aggressive 
use of force and it specifically acknowledges the use of force in self-defense. 
 
There is no consensus over the point in time at which such a counter-offensive IW attack 
in self-defense can be taken.[SHARP99]   There are two options: (1) a preemptive attack 
before an anticipated attack occurs or (2) a second-strike attack in response after an attack 
has occurred or is in the progress of occurring.  The right to respond in anticipatory self-
defense or second-strike does not apply to the penetration of all government systems 
during peacetime but it should apply presumptively to those sensitive systems that are 
critical to a state’s vital national interests.   There is the most difficult tactical problem of 
not only identifying the attack and the attacker but also discerning intent since what may 
appear as a primary IW attack may in reality be pre-attack exploration, espionage, or 
vandalism.17   The state-of-the-art in accurately predicting intent is based on studying 
patterns of IW attack.  [GREENBERG99] presents a classification of IW attacks based on 
physical intrusiveness and physical destructiveness. 
 
Some scholars conclude that the customary international law right of a preemptive self-
defense is incorporated in Article 51 of the UN Charter while others conclude to the 
contrary.    An example of a preemptive attack was the 1980 Israeli bombing of an Iraq 
nuclear power plant suspected of making weapon-grade plutonium.  An example of a 
second-strike attack is the August 1998 U.S. bombing of terrorist camps in Afghanistan 
and Sudan in response to U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.   The U.S. 
justified these second-strike attacks as lawful under the right to self-defense as 
recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter.    
 
The U.S. Space Command in Colorado assumed the responsibility for offensive IW 
programs on October 1999.   As part of the nation’s national defense plan, the U.S. 
military is drafting plans to penetrate and disrupt computers of enemy 
nations.[MCCULLUGH00]  The Pentagon’s January 2000 announcement of its counter-
                                                          
18 Retired Lt. General Carl O’Berry, former Air Force deputy chief of staff for C4I and a member of the 
NRC committee states, “We debated [the cyberattack recommendation].  We have foes with unlimited 
opportunities to attack while we maintain a defensive crouch [at a time] when some people think we are in 
a cyberwar.”[BREWIN99] 
19 These issues lead John Pike, an analyst with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) to state, “Does 
this mean the Pentagon will then start frying the home PCs of American teen-age hackers?” 
  
 
 
15
offensive strategy had been quietly discussed for nearly a year and came at a time when 
military worries about hackers were at an all-time high due to anticipated terrorist attacks 
on Y2K (which never materialized).   
 
Practically, a policy allowing the military to “hack-back” against an attacker has several 
problems: (1) the unanticipated, and possibly counter-productive, technical consequences 
of transmitting an attack against an attacker; (2) legal prohibitions against such action 
(deploying troops) on U.S. soil; (3) the need to get clearance from countries in which 
routers between the two principal parties are located; (4) technical difficulties in 
identifying the attacker; and (5) shortages of staff to do the work.  Hack-back can take 
many forms such as transmitting a virus, denial-of-service or flooding attacks, chipping 
(hardware-based malicious software), and directed energy weapons that effectively 
destroy electronic systems.  It is unexplored territory, no one knows how a nation would 
respond to an IW attack or counter-attack. 
 
The U.S. military has signaled that its response to an IW attack would be devastating.   
The Pentagon’s Office of General Counsel stated in the 1999 document, An Assessment 
of International Legal Issues in Information Operations, the consequences of a large-scale 
campaign of computer network attacks “might well justify a large-scale military 
response.”[STANTON00]   However, the right of self-defense under customary 
international law may not always justify a large-scale military response due to the 
principles of necessity and proportionality.  There are a spectrum of possible attack 
scenarios from threats of force to actual use of force and all levels in between.  Figure 1 
graphically depicts this spectrum of force/response scenarios adapted from [SHARP99]. 
For instance, a low-level verbal threat to use force, while not prohibiting an attack in self-
defense, may not justify an armed response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Force Spectrum  
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States will still need to explore offensive and counter-offensive capabilities if only to test 
their defensive measures adequately.  Without knowing the extent of U.S. offensive 
capabilities or defensive vulnerabilities it is impossible to judge the desirability of 
constraining counter-offensive IW.  If the U.S. leads in the technological development of 
offensive IW, as anecdotal evidence suggests, it would be counterproductive to draw 
attention to limiting IW weapons.18  Other nations would be justifiably suspicious of the 
any U.S. effort to protect its technological advantage or restrain the development of their 
competing IW capabilities. 
 
During the Kosovo bombing campaign last year, the Pentagon set up a high-level 
information operations cell for offensive IW attacks.  According to Admiral James Ellis, 
NATO’s Number 2 military commander during the war, “All the tools were in place.”  
The official line is that the U.S. held back and by the time Pentagon lawyers had 
approved an IW attack against Serbia events had overtaken the need for such a 
strike.[STROBEL00]  However, the details of part of the IW attack plan was leaked by 
senior intelligence officials to Newsweek.[VISTICA99]  The attack plan called for U.S. 
government hackers to tap into Serbian Leader’s Slobodan Milosevic’s foreign bank 
accounts.   The policy ramification of such an attack – a U.S.-sponsored plan to break 
into foreign banks – would be a breach of national sovereignty in friendly nations and 
opened the door to computer attacks on U.S. banks.   Ultimately, the U.S. would have 
been the main loser if confidence in the world banking system were undermined by such 
attacks. 
 
 
6.0  Summary 
 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 
changes our risk management profile for IW attacks.  The details of this terrorist attack 
are just being investigated but it is clear that there were some IW components supporting 
this primarily physical kinectic attack. Before September 11, 2001, large scale distributed 
denial-of-service attacks on major corporate websites in February 2000 and continuous 
virus threats have been our experience with IW.  These pure IW attacks did not cause 
critical or lasting damage, but they did take hypothesized threats out of the realm of the 
abstract and made them real.  Given such attacks cannot currently be stopped and will 
likely increase in frequency, this paper has dealt with the defensive options available to 
responding to such attacks from non-state and state-sponsored attackers.   
 
First, it has been established that IW attacks, even those attacks that are not directly lethal 
or physically destructive, constitute the use of force or armed attack in the United Nations 
Charter.  Such attacks thus may be legal forms of coercion even in peacetime, and the use 
of conventional armed forces may not be an appropriate response to such attacks; indeed 
                                                          
20 Emmet Paige, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
(C4I) stated in 1995, “We [the US DoD] have an offensive [IW] capability, but we can’t discuss it… 
[However] you’d feel good if you knew about it.”  (Munro, Neil. “Pentagon Developing Cyberspace 
Weapons.” Washington Technology, June 22, 1995.) 
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such a response might be considered a hostile act.    It is equally unclear whether some of 
the damage that IW attacks could inflict, such as by disrupting government and private 
information systems, is the sort of damage that international humanitarian law is intended 
to restrain. A recommendation is that the U.S. could pursue international definitions of 
“force” and “armed attack” in the new IW context and create international protection 
schemes for critical information systems.  Such international consensus will help 
establish when IW attacks can be conducted, what is off-limit for legitimate attacks, and 
how countries may respond to IW attacks. IW may be an appropriate area for arms 
control agreements in the future, however, the wide dissemination, commercial nature, 
and lack of verification mechanisms suggest that such a mechanism is premature at this 
time. 
 
Second, since IW attacks are executed across international networks, the U.S. (among 
others) will need to rely upon foreign assistance to identify and respond to attackers.   A 
recommendation is the U.S. should pursue international cooperation against IW attacks, 
encouraging joint investigation and prosecution of those state and non-state actors 
responsible for IW attacks, particularly terrorists and criminals.     
 
Third, the ambiguous state of international law regarding IW may leave space for the 
U.S. to pursue offensive as well as counter-offensive IW.  Conversely, it may permit 
adversaries to attack the U.S. and its systems.   When considering policy options, U.S. 
decision-makers must balance offensive opportunities against defensive vulnerabilities, a 
balance that is beyond the scope of this paper.  In this context, policy and law 
complement preparedness and ingenuity in the development of defensive IW technology, 
which will contribute to solving or worsening this problem. 
 
Lastly, as in all forms of warfare, IW is dynamic.  Since 1997 IW attacks have occurred 
with increasing frequency and responses to these attacks have evolved.  It should be self-
evident why the U.S. and the international community should be addressing the policy 
and technology issues of IW now rather than having to address them during an 
emergency where options and precedents are often set by exigencies rather than strategic 
planning.   
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